# Barracudas Lab Supplement – CNDI 2014

## GMO Fish Supplement

### Econ Add On

**Invasive Species destroy biodiversity and cause extinction—empirics prove**

**NSF 10**

(National Science Foundation. December 29, 2010. “What Triggers Mass Extinctions? Study Shows How Invasive Species Stop New Life.” <http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=118292>)

**An influx of invasive species can stop the** dominant **natural process of new species formation and trigger mass extinction events**, according to research results published today in the journal PLoS ONE. The study of the **collapse of Earth's marine life** 378 to **375 million years ago suggests that the planet's current ecosystems, which are struggling with biodiversity loss, could meet a similar fate.** Although Earth has experienced five major mass extinction events, **the** environmental **crash during the Late Devonian was unlike any other** in the planet's history. **The actual number of extinctions wasn't higher than the natural rate of species loss, but very few new species arose.** "**We refer to the Late Devonian as a mass extinction, but it was actually a biodiversity crisis," said** Alycia **Stigall, a scientist at Ohio University** and author of the PLoS ONE paper. "This research significantly contributes to our understanding of species invasions from a deep-time perspective," said Lisa Boush, program director in the National Science Foundation (NSF)'s Division of Earth Sciences, which funded the research. "The knowledge is critical to determining the cause and extent of mass extinctions through time, especially the five biggest biodiversity crises in the history of life on Earth. It provides an important perspective on our current biodiversity crises." The research suggests that the typical method by which new species originate--vicariance--was absent during this ancient phase of Earth's history, and could be to blame for the mass extinction. Vicariance occurs when a population becomes geographically divided by a natural, long-term event, such as the formation of a mountain range or a new river channel, and evolves into different species. New species also can originate through dispersal, which occurs when a subset of a population moves to a new location. In a departure from previous studies, Stigall used phylogenetic analysis, which draws on an understanding of the tree of evolutionary relationships to examine how individual speciation events occurred. She focused on one bivalve, Leptodesma (Leiopteria), and two brachiopods, Floweria and Schizophoria (Schizophoria), as well as a predatory crustacean, Archaeostraca. These small, shelled marine animals were some of the most common inhabitants of the Late Devonian oceans, which had the most extensive reef system in Earth's history. The seas teemed with huge predatory fish such as Dunkleosteus, and smaller life forms such as trilobites and crinoids (sea lilies). The first forests and terrestrial ecosystems appeared during this time; amphibians began to walk on land. As sea levels rose and the continents closed in to form connected land masses, however, some species gained access to environments they hadn't inhabited before. **The hardiest of** these **invasive species that could thrive** on a variety of food sources and **in new climates became dominant, wiping out more locally adapted species. The invasive species were so prolific** at this time **that it became difficult for many new species to arise.** "The main mode of speciation that occurs in the geological record is shut down during the Devonian," said Stigall. "It just stops in its tracks." Of the species Stigall studied, most lost substantial diversity during the Late Devonian, and one, Floweria, became extinct. **The entire marine ecosystem suffered a major collapse. Reef-forming corals were decimated and reefs did not appear on Earth again for 100 million years.** The giant fishes, trilobites, sponges and brachiopods also declined dramatically, while organisms on land had much higher survival rates. **The study is relevant for the current biodiversity crisis**, Stigall said, **as human activity has introduced a high number of invasive species into new ecosystems.** In addition, the modern extinction rate exceeds the rate of ancient extinction events, including the event that wiped out the dinosaurs 65 million years ago.

#### Results in trillions of dollars of losses

**European Union 6**

(“Developing an EU Framework for Invasive Alien Species.” <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/invasivealien/docs/ias_discussion_paper.pdf>)

**Invasive Alien Species (IAS) cause major economic problems related to their prevention, control and eradication** (e.g. congestions in waterways, damages to forestry, to crops, to building property, damages in urban areas, etc.). Examples: - The costs of preventing, controlling and/or eradicating IAS and the environmental and economic damages are significant. The **annual economic losses caused by introduced pests** to crops, pastures, and forests in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, India, and Brazil **amount to nearly** US **$230 billion**. The **annual environmental loss** caused by introduced pests in the same countries **were calculated at over $100 billion.** The calculated cost per capita for the losses incurred due to biological invaders in the six nations investigated were approximately $240 per year. Assuming similar costs **worldwide**, **damage from invasive species would be more than $1.4 trillion per year, representing nearly 5% of the world economy**8 . - The introduced comb-jellyfish caused losses to the anchovy fisheries in the Black Sea estimated at $17 million annually9 . - IAS-related economic damage in Germany’s inland water systems from erosion of river banks and embankments is estimated at 32 million € per year for Fallopia species and 12 million € per year for Heracleum mantegazzianum and for the muskrat Ondatra zibethicus10. - The introduction of the salmon parasite Gyrodactylus salaries to more than 46 rivers and 37 aquaculture facilities in Norway has decreased the density of salmon by 86% in infected rivers. Losses of income and opportunities for recreational fishing due to Gyrodactylus salaries have been calculated to about 20 million €11. - Damage to the cultural and landscape and aesthetically valued areas caused by the introduction of insects and diseases which kill and maim trees in parks, urban areas and cultural valued tree plantings are substantial. The Chestnut leaf miner, Sudden oak death caused by Phytophtora species, Dutch elm disease has caused substantial economic costs in European cities, parks and cultural valuable landscapes for control measures and replacing trees which have been affected. From the economic perspective, biodiversity provides benefits for present and future generations by providing ecosystem services. However biodiversity provides not only ecosystem services to humans but also important values (emotional, cultural) loss of which means loss for future generations.

8 Pimentel, D., S. McNair, J. Janecka, J. Wightman, C. Simmonds, C. O’Connell, E. Wong, L. Russel, J. Zern, T. Aquino, T. Tsomondo 2001. Economic and environmental threats of alien plant, animal, and microbe invasions. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 84 (2001) 1–20. 9 D. Knowler and E. Barbier (2000). The Economics of an Invading Species: A Theoretical Model and Case Study Application. The Economics of Invading Species. Edited by C. Perrings, M. Williamson and S. Dalmazzone. Edward Elgar, U.K. 10 Case study cited in SBSTTA 2005. The ecological and socio-economic impacts of invasive alien species on inland water ecosystems (UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/10/1). 11 B.O. Johnsen (2006). NOBANIS Invasive Alien Species Fact Sheet – Gyrodactylus salaries. From Online Database of the North European and Baltic Network on IAS. NOBANIS www.nobanis.org

## No War

### 1AC Contention

#### Contention Four is The Truth:

#### First—interdependence stops war

**Deudney et al 9** (Daniel, professor of political science at John Hopkins, and John Ikenberry, professor of international affairs at Princeton, Foreign Affairs, “The Myth of Autocratic Revival,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63721/daniel-deudney-and-g-john-ikenberry/the-myth-of-the-autocratic-revival)  
This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities -- of pushes and pulls -- that **reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving**. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

#### Second—nuclear deterrence makes conflict irrational—empirics prove fears of escalation and miscalc are false

**Murdock 8**, Clark Murdock, senior advisor at CSIS, March 2008, “the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century,” CSIS, online

From a systemic perspective, nuclear deterrence suppressed the level of violence associated with major power competition: wartime fatalities consumed 2 percent of the world’s population in the 1600s and 1700s, about 1 percent in the 1800s, about 1.5 percent in World War I and 2.5 percent in World War II, but about one-tenth during the Cold War (minus the Korean War, which pushed fatalities up to 0.5 percent). A leading practitioner of the art of nuclear deterrence, Sir Michael Quinlan, aptly observed: “Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war, than one with major war but no nuclear weapons.”17 Despite the close calls and the now almost inexplicable buildup of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, the fact remains: nuclear weapons kept the superpower competition from becoming a war. The violence-suppressive effect of nuclear weapons has not gone away with the end of the Cold War. Noted Cold War deterrent theorist and Nobel economics laureate Thomas Schelling told a recent World Economic Forum retreat (according to Thomas Barnett, the Pentagon’s favorite futurist) that (1) no state that has developed nuclear weapons has ever been attacked by another state and (2) no state armed with nuclear weapons has ever attacked another state similarly armed.18 With his characteristic flair, Barnett observes that the United States and the Soviet Union learned that nuclear weapons are for having and not using. Due to the equalizing threats of mutually assured destruction, these devices cannot win wars but only prevent them. The same logic has held—all these decades—for powers as diverse as the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel, with North Korea stepping up to the plate and Iran on deck. Thus we have survived the democratic bomb and the totalitarian bomb, as well as the capitalist bomb and the communist bomb. In religious terms, we have survived the Christian and atheist bombs, the Confucian and Hindu bombs and the Islamic and Jewish bombs. Somehow, **despite all the “irrationalities” ascribed to each new member, the logic of nuclear deterrence holds fast**.19

#### Third—permanent psychological evolution checks major war

**Fettweis 6**, Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at Tulane University, 2006, (Christopher J., strategist for two year at the US Naval War College, “A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or What if Mueller Is Right?” International Studies Review, pp. 677-697)

Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically **unidirectional**—few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the "rules of the game" of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.

#### Fourth—regional organizations and global institutions will contain conflicts

**Robb 12** – Lieutenant Doug Robb, U,S. Navy Proceedings Magazine - May 2012 Vol |38/5/I,3I I “Now Hear This - Why the Age of Great-Power War Is Over” In Proceedings ’ April “Now Hear This,”)

Navy Lieutenant Commander Rachel Gosnell and Marine Second Lieutenant Michael Orzetti argue that “the possibility of great-power war [between the United States and China] cannot be ruled out.” However, despite China’s rise, which potentially threatens to alter international polarity, a preponderance of evidence suggests that the era of conventional large-scale war may be behind us. For the purposes of my argument, the United States and China are defined as “great powers” because they have stable governments and large populations; influential economies and access to raw materials; professional militaries and a nuclear arsenal. Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s “trinity,” which characterizes the interrelationship between the government (politics), people (society and the economy), and the military (in modern terms, deterrence and security), is useful to frame this debate. The 20th century brought seismic shifts as the global political system transitioned from being multipolar during the first 40 years to bipolar during the Cold War before emerging as the American-led, unipolar international order we know today. These changes notwithstanding, major world powers have been at peace for nearly seven decades—the longest such period since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia codified the sovereign nation-state. Whereas in years past, when nations allied with their neighbors in ephemeral bonds of convenience, today’s global politics are tempered by permanent international organizations, regional military alliances, and formal economic partnerships. Thanks in large part to the prevalence of liberal democracies, these groups are able to moderate international disputes and provide forums for nations to air grievances, assuage security concerns, and negotiate settlements—thereby making war a distant (and distasteful) option. As a result, China (and any other global power) has much to lose by flouting international opinion, as evidenced by its advocacy of the recent Syrian uprising, which has drawn widespread condemnation. In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense. Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.” Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable. In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.” As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.”

#### Fifth—peacekeeping stops conflicts from spreading

**Goldstein 11** — professor emeritus of international relations at American University (Joshua S., “Think Again: War”, Foreign Policy, September/October 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war)

It does now. The early 1990s were boom years for the blue helmets, with 15 new U.N. peacekeeping missions launched from 1991 to 1993 — as many as in the U.N.'s entire history up to that point. The period was also host to peacekeeping's most spectacular failures. In Somalia, the U.N. arrived on a mission to alleviate starvation only to become embroiled in a civil war, and it quickly pulled out after 18 American soldiers died in a 1993 raid. In Rwanda in 1994, a weak U.N. force with no support from the Security Council completely failed to stop a genocide that killed more than half a million people. In Bosnia, the U.N. declared "safe areas" for civilians, but then stood by when Serbian forces overran one such area, Srebrenica, and executed more than 7,000 men and boys. (There were peacekeeping successes, too, such as in Namibia and Mozambique, but people tend to forget about them.) In response, the United Nations commissioned a report in 2000, overseen by veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, examining how the organization's efforts had gone wrong. By then the U.N. had scaled back peacekeeping personnel by 80 percent worldwide, but as it expanded again the U.N. adapted to lessons learned. It strengthened planning and logistics capabilities and began deploying more heavily armed forces able to wade into battle if necessary. As a result, the 15 missions and 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed worldwide today are meeting with far greater success than their predecessors. Overall, the presence of peacekeepers has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood of a war's reigniting after a cease—fire agreement. In the 1990s, about half of all cease—fires broke down, but in the past decade the figure has dropped to 12 percent. And though the U.N.'s status as a perennial punching bag in American politics suggests otherwise, these efforts are quite popular: In a 2007 survey, 79 percent of Americans favored strengthening the U.N. That's not to say there isn't room for improvement — there's plenty. But the U.N. has done a lot of good around the world in containing war.

#### Last—here’s a framing question—prefer our longitudinal analysis of war—their authors are alarmists

**Fettweis 10** Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Comparative Politics from the University of Maryland-College Park, October 27, 2010 (Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, Georgetown University Press, ISBN 978-1-58901-710-8, Chapter 4: Evaluating the Crystal Balls, p. 83-85)

The obsolescence-of-major-war vision of the future differs most drastically from all the others, including the neorealist, in its expectations of the future of conflict in the international system. If the post– Cold War world conformed to neorealist and other pessimistic predictions, warfare ought to continue to be present at all levels of the system, appearing with increasing regularity once the stabilizing influence of bipolarity was removed. If the liberal-constructivist vision is correct, then the world ought to have seen not only no major wars, but also a decrease in the volume and intensity of all kinds of conflict in every region as well. The evidence supports the latter. Major wars tend to be rather memorable, so there is little need to demonstrate that there has been no such conflict since the end of the Cold War. But the data seem to support the “trickledown” theory of stability as well. Empirical **analyses of warfare** have **consistently shown** that the number of all types of wars—interstate, civil, ethnic, revolutionary, and so forth— declined throughout the 1990s and into the new century, after a brief surge of postcolonial conflicts in the first few years of that decade. 2 Overall levels of conflict tell only part of the story, however. Many other aspects of international behavior, including some that might be considered secondary effects of warfare, are on the decline as well. Some of the more important, if perhaps under reported, aggregate global trends include the following: Ethnic conflict. Ethnonational wars for independence have declined to their lowest level since 1960, the first year for which we have data. 3 Repression and political discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland has tracked a decline in the number of minority groups around the world that experience discrimination at the hands of states, from seventy-five in 1991 to forty-one in 2003. 4 War termination versus outbreak. War termination settlements have proven to be more stable over time, and the number of new conflicts is lower than ever before. 5 Magnitude of conflict/battle deaths. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per year has been steadily declining. 6 The risk for the average person of dying in battle has been plummeting since World War II— and rather drastically so since the end of the Cold War. 7 Genocide. Since war is usually a necessary condition for genocide, 8 perhaps it should be unsurprising that the incidence of genocide and other mass slaughters declined by 90 percent between 1989 and 2005, memorable tragedies notwithstanding. 9 Coups. Armed overthrow of government is becoming increasingly rare, even as the number of national governments is expanding along with the number of states. 10 Would be coup plotters no longer garner the kind of automatic outside support that they could have expected during the Cold War, or at virtually any time of great power tension. Third party intervention. Those conflicts that do persist have less support from outside actors, just as the constructivists expected. When the great powers have intervened in local conflicts, it has usually been in the attempt to bring a conflict to an end or, in the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, to punish aggression. 11 Human rights abuses. Though not completely gone, the number of largescale abuses of human rights is also declining. Overall, there has been a clear, if uneven, decrease in what the Human Security Centre calls “one-sided violence against civilians” since 1989. 12 Global military spending. World military spending declined by one third in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 13 Today that spending is less than 2.5 percent of global GDP, which is about two-thirds of what it was during the Cold War. Terrorist attacks. In perhaps the most counterintuitive trend, the number of worldwide terrorist incidents is far smaller than it was during the Cold War. If Iraq and South Asia were to be removed from the data, a clear, steady downward trend would become apparent. There were 300 terrorist incidents worldwide in 1991, for instance, and 58 in 2005. 14 International conflict and crises have steadily declined in number and intensity since the end of the Cold War. By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history. Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that the rules by which international politics are run may indeed be changing.

#### This means even if they win a specific scenario makes conflict likely meta-level factors contain escalation

**Easterbrook 5** senior fellow at The New Republic, 05 [Greg, “EXPLAINING 15 YEARS OF DIMINISHING VIOLENCE — The End of War?”, <http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2009/05/31/easterbrook-end-of-war/>]

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo — combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a **cycle of decline**. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed — namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person’s chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Five years ago, two academics — Monty Marshall, research director at the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University, and Ted Robert Gurr, a professor of government at the University of Maryland — spent months compiling all available data on the frequency and death toll of twentieth-century combat, expecting to find an ever-worsening ledger of blood and destruction. Instead, they found, after the terrible years of World Wars I and II, a global increase in war from the 1960s through the mid-’80s. But this was followed by a steady, nearly uninterrupted decline beginning in 1991. They also found a steady global rise since the mid-’80s in factors that reduce armed conflict — economic prosperity, free elections, stable central governments, better communication, more “peacemaking institutions,” and increased international engagement. Marshall and Gurr, along with Deepa Khosla, published their results as a 2001 report, Peace and Conflict, for the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland [reports avaiable [here](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp)]. At the time, I remember reading that report and thinking, “Wow, this is one of the hottest things I have ever held in my hands.” I expected that evidence of a decline in war would trigger a sensation. Instead it received almost no notice. “After the first report came out, we wanted to brief some United Nations officials, but everyone at the United Nations just laughed at us. They could not believe war was declining, because this went against political expectations,” Marshall says. Of course, 2001 was the year of September 11. But, despite the battles in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere that were ignited by Islamist terrorism and the West’s response, a second edition of Peace and Conflict, published in 2003, showed the total number of wars and armed conflicts continued to decline. A third edition of the study, published last week, shows that, despite the invasion of Iraq and other outbreaks of fighting, the overall decline of war continues. This even as the global population keeps rising, which might be expected to lead to more war, not less. In his prescient 1989 book, Retreat from Doomsday, Ohio State University political scientist John Mueller, in addition to predicting that the Soviet Union was about to collapse — the Berlin Wall fell just after the book was published — declared that **great-nation war had become “obsolete**” and might **never occur again**. [A related article by Mueller is [here.](http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/SECSTUD.PDF)] One reason the Soviet Union was about to collapse, Mueller wrote, was that its leaders had structured Soviet society around the eighteenth-century assumption of endless great-power fighting, but great-power war had become archaic, and no society with war as its organizing principle can endure any longer. So far, this theory has been right on the money. It is worth noting that the first emerging great power of the new century, China, though prone to making threatening statements about Taiwan, spends relatively little on its military. Last year Mueller published a follow-up book, The Remnants of War, which argues that fighting below the level of great-power conflict — small-state wars, civil wars, ethnic combat, and clashes among private armies — is also waning. Retreat from Doomsday and The Remnants of War are brilliantly original and urgent books. Combat is not an inevitable result of international discord and human malevolence, Mueller believes. War, rather, is “merely an idea” — and a really bad idea, like dueling or slavery.

#### And it won’t cause extinction:

#### First—the newest computational models prove it doesn’t cause extinction—their evidence is deliberate misinformation

**Seitz 6 –** former associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University’s Center for InternationalAffairs (Russell, “The' Nuclear Winter ' Meltdown Photoshopping the Apocalypse”, <http://adamant.typepad.com/seitz/2006/12/preherein_honor.html>)

All that remains of Sagan's Big Chill are curves such as this , but history is full of prophets of doom who fail to deliver, not all are without honor in their own land. The 1983 'Nuclear Winter " papers in Science were so politicized that even the eminently liberal President of The Council for a Liveable World called "The **worst example** of the misrepesentation of science to the public in my memory." Among the authors was Stanford President Donald Kennedy. Today he edits Science , the nation's major arbiter of climate science--and policy. Below, a case illustrating the mid-range of the ~.7 to ~1.6 degree C maximum cooling the 2006 studies suggest is superimposed in color on the Blackly Apocalyptic predictions published in Science Vol. 222, 1983 . They're worth comparing, because the range of soot concentrations in the new models overlaps with cases assumed to have dire climatic consequences in the widely publicized 1983 scenarios -- "Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great." wrote Sagan in Foreign Affairs , Winter 1983 -84. But that "evidence" was never forthcoming. 'Nuclear Winter' never existed outside of a computer except as **air-brushed animation** commissioned by the PR firm - Porter Novelli Inc. Yet Sagan predicted "the extinction of the human species " as temperatures plummeted 35 degrees C and the world froze in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Last year, Sagan's cohort tried to reanimate the ghost in a machine anti-nuclear activists invoked in the depths of the Cold War, by re-running equally arbitrary scenarios on a modern interactive Global Circulation Model. But the Cold War is history in more ways than one. It is a credit to post-modern computer climate simulations that they do not reproduce the apocalyptic results of what Sagan oxymoronically termed "a sophisticated one dimensional model." The subzero 'baseline case' has melted down into a tepid 1.3 degrees of average cooling- grey skies do not make a Ragnarok . What remains is just not the stuff that End of the World myths are made of. It is hard to exaggerate how seriously " nuclear winter "was once taken by policy analysts who ought to have known better. Many were taken aback by the sheer force of Sagan's rhetoric Remarkably, Science's news coverage of the new results fails to graphically compare them with the old ones Editor Kennedy and other recent executives of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, once proudly co-authored and helped to publicize. You can't say they didn't try to reproduce this Cold War icon. Once again, soot from imaginary software materializes in midair by the megaton , flying higher than Mount Everest . This is not physics, but a crude exercise in ' garbage in, gospel out' parameter forcing designed to maximize and extend the cooling an aeosol can generate, by sparing it from realistic attrition by rainout in the lower atmosphere. Despite decades of progress in modeling atmospheric chemistry , there is none in this computer simulation, and ignoring photochemistry further extends its impact. Fortunately , the history of science is as hard to erase as it is easy to ignore. Their past mastery of semantic agression cannot spare the authors of "Nuclear Winter Lite " direct comparison of their new results and their old. Dark smoke clouds in the lower atmosphere don't last long enough to spread across the globe. Cloud droplets and rainfall remove them. rapidly washing them out of the sky in a matter of days to weeks- not long enough to sustain a global pall. Real world weather brings down particles much as soot is scrubbed out of power plant smoke by the water sprays in smoke stack scrubbers Robock acknowledges this- not even a single degree of cooling results when soot is released at lower elevations in he models . The workaround is to inject the imaginary aerosol at truly Himalayan elevations - pressure altitudes of 300 millibar and higher , where the computer model's vertical transport function modules pass it off to their even higher neighbors in the stratosphere , where it does not rain and particles linger.. The new studies like the old suffer from the disconnect between a desire to paint the sky black and the vicissitudes of natural history. As with many exercise in worst case models both at invoke rare phenomena as commonplace, claiming it prudent to assume the worst. But the real world is subject to Murphy's lesser known second law- if everything must go wrong, don't bet on it. In 2006 as in 1983 firestorms and forest fires that send smoke into the stratosphere rise to alien prominence in the modelers re-imagined world , but i the real one remains a very different place, where though every month sees forest fires burning areas the size of cities - 2,500 hectares or larger , stratospheric smoke injections arise but once in a blue moon. So how come these neo-nuclear winter models feature so much smoke so far aloft for so long?

#### Second—Hiroshima, volcanic eruptions, and decades of nuclear testing prove there’s no global environmental impact

**Dunning 11** (Brian, By profession I am a computer scientist, both as a Silicon Valley CTO and as a consulting engineer. My only academic credential that bears any scrutiny is in Writing for Film and Television from University of California, Los Angeles. I also have a credential that doesn't bear any scrutiny — and you'll find it at Thunderwood College. I'm also a member of the National Association of Science Writers. I've written a few books and numerous technical articles. I decided to put this experience to good use, and created the Skeptoid podcast. I'm also one of the featured bloggers on SkepticBlog, the official blog of the prospective TV series The Skeptologists which I host, “Nuclear War and Nuclear Winter,” http://skeptoid.com/episodes/4244)

So here we get into the meat of the question. We know with pretty good certainty how a given amount of smoke in the atmosphere, distributed a certain way, will affect the climate and for how long; but what we can only guess at is how much smoke is produced when a city burns after a nuke. Our guesses are educated, but they're all over the map. Cities also vary wildly in just about every relevant aspect. Let's look at what we know from history. An obvious question to ask is whether these effects have been seen with any of the nuclear tests that many nations have conducted. Some 2,000 nuclear bombs have been detonated, somewhat less than half of which were in the atmosphere and are comparable to what would be used in a war. In none of them were any harmful smoke-induced environmental effects produced. However the reason for this is quite simple. Nuclear tests are not performed in cities filled with tens of thousands of combustible buildings; they happen way out in the desert or over the ocean, and no subsequent fires are created. But what about the two cases when atomic weapons were used on real-life cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Discussion of the subsequent fires in both cities are hard to come by, as they were not really what people were focusing on. Hiroshima developed a firestorm — where it builds into a single large fire with a central heat core that draws in oxygen with a powerful wind from all around — that peaked two to three hours after the explosion. Six hours after the explosion, nearly everything combustible within a one-and-a-half kilometer radius had been consumed, and the fire was almost **completely out**, leaving over 8 square kilometers destroyed. Descriptions of residual and secondary fires outside the radius of the firestorm are rare and hard to find, but it seems likely that several hundred or thousand small fires continued for the better part of 24 hours. Photographs taken of Hiroshima over the next few days do not show any significant evidence of vast amounts of smoke. Nagasaki was hit with a larger bomb, but its geography spared it a firestorm. Whereas Hiroshima is centered in a large flat plain, Nagasaki is irregularly shaped among hills and valleys, and cleft by a large harbor. Secondary fires were widespread, and Nagasaki firefighters had to cope with a damaged water system. It took several days to get the many small structure fires controlled or burned out. But Nagasaki's geography meant that there were far fewer fires than in Hiroshima. Again, the post-nuke photographs don't show vast atmospheric plumes of smoke. When the Iraqi army set 700 of Kuwait's oil wells on fire when they retreated in 1991, the wells burned for eight months, lofting about a million tons of smoke into the atmosphere. The TTAPS team predicted global climate change effects, that fortunately failed to materialize. Carl Sagan discussed this error in his book The Demon-Haunted World, and later research discovered the reason. The smaller individual smoke plumes, spread over a wide area, did not generate sufficient uplift to get the smoke into the upper atmosphere, even though theoretically enough smoke was produced. Temperatures did drop over the Persian Gulf, but the effect remained localized. Other cataclysmic events have proven that the nuclear winter scenario is not at all far-fetched. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, also in 1991, threw some 17 million tons of particulates into the upper atmosphere that caused global temperatures to drop by about a degree for several months. Sunlight dropped by 10%. This temperature drop did not, however, have any long-term effect on agriculture. Pinatubo was only a blip compared to the K-T extinction event of some 65 million years ago, when a theorized asteroid hit us with one hundred million megatons of destructive force, lighting virtually the entire world on fire. The evidence of this is called the K-T boundary, a layer of clay found all around the world. Sunlight was reduced by 10-20% for ten years, which caused a massive cascading extinction of species from plants to herbivores to carnivores. **But we shouldn't expect anything like this to happen from a nuclear war**. Times continue to change, including the nature of warfare. Nations **no longer stockpile the megaton class weapons** popular in the 1950s and 1960s; typical yields now are a fraction of a megaton. The United States' conventional capability is now so good that it can effectively destroy an entire nation's ability to wage large-scale war overnight, using only conventional weapons. But that doesn't mean the nuclear forces are no longer needed. Should a superpower strike first against the United States with nuclear weapons, the response would more than likely be nuclear, bringing Mutually Assured Destruction into play. But what about a small nation striking first? What about nukes in the trunks of cars parked in major cities? In the modern era, it's much less clear that any superpower would necessarily have anyone to shoot back at. Increasingly, non-superpower nations are building nuclear stockpiles. India and Pakistan might get into it with one another. Israel's foes might surprise it with nuclear weapons. Who knows what North Korea and Iran might do. Smaller regional nuclear wars remain a very real possibility. According to the worst-case estimates in the TTAPS papers, about one million tons of smoke would be expected from the fires resulting from each nuclear strike. And these smaller regional nuclear combats are expected to use about 50 nuclear weapons (compare this to 150 nuclear weapons for a broader global nuclear war). Thus, today's most likely nuclear scenario would be expected to produce climate effects similar to three Pinatubo events, according to the worst estimates, and still many orders of magnitude less than the K-T extinction. And so, while the nuclear winter scenario is a good prediction of the effects of a worst-case scenario, when all the variables are at their least favorable, the strongest probabilities favor a much less catastrophic nuclear autumn; and even those effects depend strongly on variables like whether the war happens during the growing season. A bomb in Los Angeles might result in history's worst firestorm, while a bomb in the mountains of Pakistan might create no fires at all. The simple fact is that there are too many unpredictable variables to know what kind of climate effects the smoke following nuclear fires will produce, until it actually happens. Obviously we're all very mindful of the many terrible implications of nuclear combat, and if it ever happens, the prospect of a nuclear autumn will likely be among the least of our concerns. The physicist Freeman Dyson perhaps described it best when he said "(TTAPS is) an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight... Who wants to be accused of being in favor of nuclear war?"

## Answers to “No War”

### 1nc AT: “No Extinction”

#### Nuclear war would create a dust-induced winter that causes extinction

**Phillips**, PhD, Physics, Cambridge, **2000**

(Alan, , Nuclear Winter Revisited, Oct, www.peace.ca/nuclearwinterrevisited.htm)

Altogether, nuclear winter would be an ecological disaster of the same sort of magnitude as the major extinctions of species that  have occurred in the past, the most famous one being 65 million years ago at the cretaceous extinction.  Of all the species living at the time, about half became extinct.  The theory is that a large meteor made a great crater in the Gulf of California, putting a trillion tons of rock debris into the atmosphere.  That is a thousand times as much rock as is predicted for a nuclear war, but the soot from fires blocks sunlight more effectively than rock debris.  In nuclear winter there would also be radioactive contamination giving worldwide background radiation doses many times larger than has ever happened during the 3 billion years of evolution.  The radiation would notably worsen things for existing species, though it might, by increasing mutations, allow quicker evolution of new species (perhaps mainly insects and grasses) that could tolerate the post-war conditions.  (I should just mention that there is no way the radioactivity from a nuclear war could destroy "all life on earth".  People must stop saying that.  There will be plenty of evolution after a war, but **it may not include us**.)

### 1nc AT: “No War”

#### Seriously, there will be wars: economics, security dilemma, nationalism

**Mearsheimer**, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, **1999**.

(John Mearsheimer, “Is Major War Obsolete?” 1999, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/index.html)

A second reason that states go to war which, of course, is dear to the heart of realists like me, and that’s to enhance their security. Take the United States out of Europe, put the Germans on their own; you got the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other, and in between a huge buffer zone called eastern or central Europe. Call it what you want. Is it impossible to imagine the Russians and the Germans getting into a fight over control of that vacuum? Highly likely, no, but feasible, for sure. Is it hard to imagine Japan and China getting into a war over the South China Sea, not for resource reasons but because Japanese sea-lines of communication run through there and a huge Chinese navy may threaten it? I don’t think it’s impossible to imagine that.  What about nationalism, a third reason? China, fighting in the United States over Taiwan? You think that’s impossible? I don’t think that’s impossible. That’s a scenario that makes me very nervous. I can figure out all sorts of ways, none of which are highly likely, that the Chinese and the Americans end up shooting at each other. It doesn’t necessarily have to be World War III, but it is great-power war. Chinese and Russians fighting each other over Siberia? As many of you know, there are huge numbers of Chinese going into Siberia. You start mixing ethnic populations in most areas of the world outside the United States and it’s usually a prescription for big trouble. Again, not highly likely, but possible. I could go on and on, positing a lot of scenarios where great powers have good reasons to go to war against other great powers.  Second reason: There is no question that in the twentieth century, certainly with nuclear weapons but even before nuclear weapons, the costs of going to war are very high. But that doesn’t mean that war is ruled out. The presence of nuclear weapons alone does not make war obsolescent. I will remind you that from 1945 to 1990, we lived in a world where there were thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides, and there was nobody running around saying, “ War is obsolescent.” So you can’t make the argument that the mere presence of nuclear weapons creates peace. India and Pakistan are both going down the nuclear road. You don’t hear many people running around saying, “ That’s going to produce peace.” And, furthermore, if you believe nuclear weapons were a great cause of peace, you ought to be in favor of nuclear proliferation. What we need is everybody to have a nuclear weapon in their back pocket. You don’t hear many people saying that’s going to produce peace, do you?

#### Obsolescence of major war is impossible—states inevitably slip into conflicts

**Doran 99 (**Charles F., Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, Survival, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange: The Structural Turbulence of International Affairs,” June, vol.41 no.2, p.139-142)

Finally, of course, it is important to be clear about the meaning of the word at the heart of this argument. 'Obsolescence', in this context, can have two meanings. One is that something falls out of fashion. The other is that it is no longer in use. The former definition applies, perhaps, to war in general. But it does not apply to major war, because major war was never in fashion. I do not believe that any government since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has purposely sought a major war. Rather, they have slipped into major wars. They may well have been interested in fighting wars, especially if such wars were thought to be quick and not very destructive, or only destructive for the other side. But they did not expect these wars to develop into the kind that took place in the Napoleonic period, or the First and Second World Wars. That leaves the second definition, 'disuse'. Therefore the burden of the argument has to be that major wars are no longer going to happen. And that is a faith that is very difficult to maintain.

#### War can happen

**Ferguson 2008** - sr. fellow @ the Hoover Institute and professor of History @ Harvard (Niall, Hoover Digest no1 47-53 Wint 2008)

The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased since the Democrats gained control of Congress. Nor should we forget about security flashpoints such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does.

### AT: Deterrence Checks

#### Deterrence doesn’t check.

**Krieger 2009 –** professor of politics (David, September 4th, “Still loving the Bomb After All these Years” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04\_krieger\_newsweek\_response.php?krieger)

Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….”  He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.”  Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition.  “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….”  But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization.  One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.”  It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed.  Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons.  The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out.  The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation.  The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals.  Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer.  These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so.  The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.  Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.”  “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.”  But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species.  Yes, that would be serious.  He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically.  After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future.  We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.”  Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security.   Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack.  Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

### AT: Interdependence Checks

#### Trade doesn’t prevent war

**Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008 -** Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, (The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

### 2nc XT: Yes War

#### Prefer our evidence—the majority of experts think major power war is still likely.

**Mearsheimer 99** (John J., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Transcript: Is Major War Obsolete? Great Debate Series between Professor Michael Mandelbaum and Professor John J. Mearsheimer, Presider: Mr. Fareed Zakaria”, http://http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/conf/cfr10)

My third and final point here is, the fact of the matter is, that there’s hardly anybody in the national security establishment-and I bet this is true of Michael-who believes that war is obsolescent. I’m going to tell you why I think this is the case. Consider the fact that the United States stations roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 troops in Asia. We spend an enormous amount of money on defense. We’re spending almost as much money as we were spending during the Cold War on defense. We spend more money than the next six countries in the world spend on defense. The questions is, why are we spending all this money? Why are we stationing troops in Europe? Why are we stationing troops in Asia? Why are we concentrating on keeping NATO intact and spreading it eastward? I’ll tell you why, because we believe that if we don’t stay there and we pull out, trouble is going to break out, and not trouble between minor powers, but trouble between major powers. That’s why we’re there. We know very well that if we leave Europe, the Germans are going to seriously countenance, if not automatically go, and get nuclear weapons. Certainly the case with the Japanese. Do you think the Germans and the Japanese are going to stand for long not to have nuclear weapons? I don’t think that’s the case. Again, that security zone between the Germans and the Russians-there’ll be a real competition to fill that. The reason we’re there in Europe, and the reason that we’re there in Asia is because we believe that great-power war is a potential possibility, which contradicts the argument on the table. So I would conclude by asking Michael if, number one, he believes we should pull out of Europe and pull out of Asia, and number two, if he does not, why not?

### AT: No Impact

#### Nuclear war’s possible and causes extinction

**Choi 11** [Charles Q. Choi, 2-22-11, writer for National Geographic News, “Small Nuclear War Could Reverse Global Warming for Years,” http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/110223-nuclear-war-winter-global-warming-environment-science-climate-change/]

Even a regional nuclear war could spark "unprecedented" global cooling and reduce rainfall for years, according to U.S. government computer models. Widespread famine and disease would likely follow, experts speculate. During the Cold War a nuclear exchange between superpowers—such as the one feared for years between the United States and the former Soviet Union—was predicted to cause a "nuclear winter." In that scenario hundreds of nuclear explosions spark huge fires, whose smoke, dust, and ash blot out the sun for weeks amid a backdrop of dangerous radiation levels. Much of humanity eventually dies of starvation and disease. Today, with the United States the only standing superpower, nuclear winter is little more than a nightmare. But nuclear war remains a very real threat—for instance, between developing-world nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan. To see what climate effects such a regional nuclear conflict might have, scientists from NASA and other institutions modeled a war involving a hundred Hiroshima-level bombs, each packing the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT—just 0.03 percent of the world's current nuclear arsenal. (See a National Geographic magazine feature on weapons of mass destruction.) The researchers predicted the resulting fires would kick up roughly five million metric tons of black carbon into the upper part of the troposphere, the lowest layer of the Earth's atmosphere. In NASA climate models, this carbon then absorbed solar heat and, like a hot-air balloon, quickly lofted even higher, where the soot would take much longer to clear from the sky.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction

**Wickersham ’10** - University of Missouri adjunct professor of Peace Studies and a member of The Missouri University Nuclear Disarmament Education Team, author book about nuclear disarmament education (Bill, 4/11/10, “Threat of ‘nuclear winter’ remains New START treaty is step in right direction.” <http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2010/apr/11/threat-of-nuclear-winter-remains/>)

In addressing the environmental consequences of nuclear war, Columbian Steve Starr has written a summary of studies published by the Bulletin of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, which concludes: **“U.S. researchers have confirmed the scientific validity of the concept of ‘nuclear winter’** and have demonstrated that any conflict which targets even a tiny fraction of the global arsenal will cause catastrophic disruptions of the global climate.” In another statement on his Web site, Starr says: “If 1% of the nuclear weapons now ready for war were detonated in large cities, they would utterly devastate the environment, climate, ecosystems and inhabitants of Earth. A war fought with thousands of strategic nuclear weapons **would leave the Earth uninhabitable**.”

#### Their studies are flawed- most qualified evidence proves even limited exchanges cause nuclear winter

**Robok ’09 -** Professor of climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and the associate director of its Center for Environmental Prediction; holds a doctorate in meteorology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a Fellow of the American Meteorological Society, is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and is President of the Atmospheric Sciences Section of the American Geophysical Union (Alan, 1/6/09, Encyclopedia of Earth, “Nuclear Winter,” http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear\_winter)

Nuclear winter is a term that describes the climatic effects of nuclear war. In the 1980's, work conducted jointly by Western and Soviet scientists showed that for a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union the climatic consequences, and indirect effects of the collapse of society, would be so severe that the ensuing nuclear winter would produce famine for billions of people far from the target zones. There are several wrong impressions that people have about nuclear winter. One is that there was a flaw in the theory and that the large climatic effects were disproven. Another is that the problem, even if it existed, has been solved by the end of the nuclear arms race. But these are both wrong, new nuclear states threaten global climate change even with arsenals that are much less than 1% of the current global arsenal.

#### Nuclear war destroys the ozone

**Toon et al ’08 -** chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder Michael J. Mills, Owen B. Toon, Richard P. Turco, Douglas E. Kinnison, and Rolando R. Garcia (2/7/08, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, “Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict,” http://www.pnas.org/content/105/14/5307.abstract)

We use a chemistry-climate model and new estimates of smoke produced by fires in contemporary cities to calculate the impact on stratospheric ozone of a regional nuclear war between developing nuclear states involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs exploded in cities in the northern subtropics. We find column ozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25–45% at midlatitudes, and 50–70% at northern high latitudes persisting for 5 years, with substantial losses continuing for 5 additional years. Column ozone amounts remain near or <220 Dobson units at all latitudes even after three years, constituting an extratropical “ozone hole.” The resulting increases in UV radiation could impact the biota significantly, including serious consequences for human health. The primary cause for the dramatic and persistent ozone depletion is heating of the stratosphere by smoke, which strongly absorbs solar radiation. The smoke-laden air rises to the upper stratosphere, where removal mechanisms are slow, so that much of the stratosphere is ultimately heated by the localized smoke injections. Higher stratospheric temperatures accelerate catalytic reaction cycles, particularly those of odd-nitrogen, which destroy ozone. In addition, the strong convection created by rising smoke plumes alters the stratospheric circulation, redistributing ozone and the sources of ozone-depleting gases, including N2O and chlorofluorocarbons. The ozone losses predicted here are significantly greater than previous “nuclear winter/UV spring” calculations, which did not adequately represent stratospheric plume rise. Our results point to previously unrecognized mechanisms for stratospheric ozone depletion.

## Answers to Wilderson

**2ac --- Getting Better**

**There is demonstrable progress in racial inequality—this is *not* to say that everything is perfect, but it does prove that pragmatic change is possible within the current system**

**Feldscher**, Harvard School of Public Health, **9/19/’13**

(Karen, “Progress, but challenges in reducing racial disparities,” http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/progress-but-challenges-in-reducing-racial-disparities/)

September 19, 2013 — **Disparities between blacks and whites in the U.S. remain pronounced**—and health is no exception. **A panel of experts at** Harvard School of Public Health (**HSPH**) **discussed these disparities**—what they are, why they persist, and what to do about them—at a September 12, 2013 event titled “Dialogue on Race, Justice, and Public Health.” **The event** was held in Kresge G-1 and **featured** panelists Lisa **Coleman, Harvard University’s chief diversity officer;** David **Williams**, Florence Sprague Norman and Laura Smart Norman **Professor of Public Health** in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences; Chandra **Jackson**, Yerby **Postdoctoral Research Fellow in** the HSPH Department of **Nutrition; and** Zinzi **Bailey**, a fifth-year **doctoral student in** the HSPH Department of **Social and Behavioral Sciences.** Robert **Blendon**, Richard L. Menschel **Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis** at HSPH, **moderated** the discussion. **Gains, but pains** Health care disparities are troubling, Coleman said. One study found that doctors recommended coronary revascularization—bypass surgery that replaces blocked blood vessels with new ones—among white patients with heart disease 50% of the time, but just 23% of the time for blacks. Black women are less likely to be given a bone marrow density test than white women, even when it’s known they’ve had prior fractures. And the black infant mortality rate is 2.3 times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. **Each speaker acknowledged that racial minorities have made significant gains** over the past half-century, **but** said **there is** much **more work** still **to do.** **They cited** statistics providing stark evidence of continuing disparities in **health, wealth, education, income, arrest and incarceration rates, foreclosure rates, and poverty.**  Coleman called the data “disconcerting; in some cases, alarming.” **Schools are desegregated**, she said, **but not integrated**; median income is $50,000 per year for whites but $31,000 a year for blacks and $37,000 a year for Hispanics; since the 1960s, the unemployment rate among blacks has been two to two-and-a-half times higher than for whites; and one in three black men can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes. Blendon shared results from surveys that accentuate sharp differences of opinion about how well blacks are faring in the U.S. For instance, in a survey that asked participants if they thought that the lives of black Americans had changed dramatically over the past 50 years, 54% of whites said yes but only 29% of blacks did. Another survey asked whether or not people approved of the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial; 51% of whites approved but only 9% of blacks did. **Reducing disparities** through research, education Jackson talked about growing up in a segregated neighborhood in Atlanta and attending a school with 99% black students and inadequate resources. She became the first in her family to attend college. Now, through her research, she hopes to expose and reduce racial health disparities. In a recent study in the American Journal of Epidemiology, Jackson and colleagues reported that blacks—particularly black professionals—get less sleep than whites, which can have potentially negative impacts on health. **Bailey discussed** what’s known as **the “school-to-prison pipeline”—**a trajectory in which black teens do poorly in school, get held back a grade, drop out, commit a crime, then end up in jail. **On the flip side, she said, there are** “diversity **pipelines**” **to** recruit minority students into **higher education.** “Often these programs target students who have already avoided the school-to-prison pipeline,” Bailey said, noting that she would like to see higher education institutions connect with black students at earlier ages to steer them toward positive choices.

**2ac --- Nihilism Bad**

**Nihilism is a self-fulfilling prophecy – progressivism checks white violence**

**Miah** quoting **West, 94** (Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the **most basic issue** now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,”the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as longas hope remains and meaning is preserved,the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive**.** The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)

**2ac --- Perm**

**Perm do both – inclusion of pragmatic, reformist coalitions is key to political effectiveness**

**Winant, 97** – Howard Winant, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for New racial Studies at UC Santa Barbara, September-October 1997, “Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics,” online: http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html

Although the differences and indeed the hostility -- between the neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we consider it vital that adherents of each project recognize that they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy in the contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites. Both of these positions need to draw on each other, not only in strategic terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities, including whiteness -- have become implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and superexploitation. There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for **strong**, class-conscious, **transracial coalitions**. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them. Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim, abolitionists should also be able to recognize that racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation. To use a postmodern language I dislike: racial identities are deeply "hybridized"; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).v

**2ac --- Pragmatism**

**All-or-nothing choice fails – small reforms towards concrete policies are the only viable solutions**

**Wright 7** (Erik Olin, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of **institutional alternatives** that embody **emancipatory values**, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are **intermediate reforms** that have two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the **fuller** program of **transformation**, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

**Pragmatism is good**

**Sullivan, 8** (Shannon Sullivan, Head of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies at Pennsylvania State University, Spring 2008, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism: Royce and the Rehabilitation of a Racial Category,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 2)

It is commonly acknowledged today, at least in academic circles, that racial essences do not exist. Racial categories, including whiteness, are historical and political products of human activity, and for that reason the human racial landscape has changed [End Page 236] over time and likely will continue to change in the future. In the wake of this acknowledgement, critical race theorists and philosophers of race debate **whether whiteness must be eliminated** for racial oppression to be ended. Given whiteness’s history as a category of violent racial exclusion, eliminativists and “new abolitionists” have argued that it must be abolished. If “whiteness is one pole of an unequal relationship, which can no more exist without oppression than slavery could exist without slaves,” then as long as whiteness endures, so does racial oppression.2 In contrast, critical conservationists have claimed even though it has an oppressive past, whiteness could entail something other than racism and oppression. Moreover, since lived existential categories like whiteness **cannot be merely or quickly eliminated**, white people should work to transform whiteness into an anti-racist category. I count myself as a critical conservationist, but I also acknowledge the force of eliminativist arguments. If whiteness necessarily involves racist oppression, then attempting to transform whiteness into an anti-racist category would be a fool’s game at best, and a covert continuance of white supremacy at worst. My goal here is not to rehearse the disagreement between new abolitionists and critical conservationists; excellent work explaining the details of their positions already exists.3 I instead approach that disagreement by asking the **pragmatic question** of whether a rehabilitated version of whiteness can be worked out concretely. What would a non-oppressive, anti-racist whiteness look like? **What difference would or could it make to the lives of white and non-white people**? If the question of how to transform whiteness cannot be answered in some practical detail—if it’s not a difference that makes a difference—then critical conservatism would amount to a hopeful, but ultimately harmful abstraction that makes no difference in lived experience and that damages anti-racist movements. In that case, abolitionism would appear to be the only alternative to ongoing white supremacy and privilege. I propose turning to Josiah Royce for help with these issues, more specifically to his essay on “Provincialism.”4 This turn is not as surprising as it might initially seem given that Royce wrote explicitly about race in “Race Questions and Prejudices.”5 In that essay, Royce issued an anti-racist, anti-essentialist challenge to then-current scientific studies of race, especially anthropology and ethnology, which claim to prove the superiority of white people, and he even briefly but explicitly names whiteness a possible threat to the future of humanity. 6 I focus here on “Provincialism,” however, because even though the essay never explicitly discusses race, it can help explain the ongoing need for the category of whiteness and implicitly offers a wealth of useful suggestions for how to transform it. “Provincialism” is an exercise in critical conservation of the concept of provincialism, and while not identical, provincialism and whiteness share enough in common that “wise” provincialism can serve [End Page 237] as a model for developing “wise” whiteness.7 Royce’s essay thus can be of great help to critical philosophers of race wrestling with questions of whether and how to transformatively conserve whiteness. Exploring similarities and differences between wise provincialism and wise whiteness, I use Royce’s analyses of provincialism to shed light on why **whiteness should be rehabilitated rather than discarded** and how white people today might begin living whiteness as an anti-racist category.

**2ac --- State Good**

**Rejecting the state fails and causes massive suffering — vote aff to reform the state**

**Pasha 96** [July-Sept. 1996, Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 283-302, JSTOR]

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of **greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice**; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. **A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built.** Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. **A rejection of the state** as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination **must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order** based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, **a reconstruction** of state-society re- lations **inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions.** A **recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state.** An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide **im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state**. Nowhere are these costs borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where time-space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to rhythms dictated by globalization.

**2ac --- AT: Root Cause**

**No root cause**

**Shelby, 7** (Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity)

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not **impossible**, for the members of a poor black community to determine withanyaccuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some **other explanation** altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials. There are very real **empirical difficulties** in determining the **specific causal significance** of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry**,** historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on **open public debate**—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable. These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help exposethesuperficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or **white supremacy**. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically groundedanalysis **is needed to** comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

**War turns it**

**Marable 2** (Manning Marable, October 11, 2002, Professor of History and Political Science at Colombia University, “Global Apartheid in the Twenty-first Century”, Peacework, http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org//DanLi)

The links between racism and war: The militarism and political intolerance displayed in the Bush administration's response to the September 11 attacks created a natural breeding ground for bigotry and racial harassment. For the Reverend Jerry Falwell, the September 11 tragedy was God's condemnation of a secularist, atheistic America. Falwell attributed the attacks to "the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the lesbians and of course the ACLU." After a firestorm of criticism, Reverend Falwell was forced to apologize. Less well-publicized were the hate-filled commentaries of journalist Anne Coulter, who declared after September 11 that "we should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them all to Christianity." Similar voices of intolerance were also being heard in Europe. For example, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that Western civilization was clearly "superior to Islamic culture." He praised imperialism, predicting that "the West will continue to conquer peoples, just as it conquered communism." Falwell, Berlusconi, and others illustrate the direct linkage between racism and war, between imperialism and militarism. The relationship is symbiotic. In a racialized social hierarchy, you cannot pursue a policy of mass coercion, the use of the prisons as a means of warehousing the unemployed and the poor and the working poor in the United States, without constructing an ideology that justifies your actions. The same thing is true in a global context. If you have a global world order of apartheid, globalized apartheid, the haves and the have-nots, as Malcolm X put it at the end of his life, the fundamental division on the global scale, when you pursue war in the interest of maintaining that division--you must utilize the demonization; you must denigrate the cultures of the others. The globalized other, therefore, is demonized. Consequently, we cannot talk about the war against terrorism and the construction of the globalized other unless we also look at its origins in terms of racism.

**Ignoring consequences is the logic of racism**

**Barndt 7** – director of Crossroads, a ministry to dismantle racism (Joseph, Understanding and Dismantling Racism, p 150, AG)

We can understand this better if we compare our experiences as white people with the experiences of people of color on the receiving end of educational, housing, welfare, police, labor, political, and economic institutional activity. Then we will see that racism is far more than the occasional actions of an individual teacher, real estate agent, social worker, police officer, ward leader, or bank loan officer. Rather, it is the product of the structure, organization, policies, and practices of the institutions that these individual people represent. People of color have almost no power in comparison with white people to direct and control these institutions. Moreover, most institutions have virtually no accountability relationship to people of color. And when institutions have no accountability relationship to their constituency, they can do as they please without fear of the consequence.

**Even if they’re right, framing whiteness as the root causes kills solvency**

**Shelby, 7** (Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

The distinction between disadvantages caused by racism, on the one hand, and by race-neutral social factors, on the other, draws attention to the fact that blacks as individuals or as a group will often have **common interests** with members of nonblack groups. And given the magnitude of some social problems—such as increasing economic inequality, declining real wages, substandard public schools, urban poverty and joblessness, the scarcity of low-cost quality housing, and the high costs of adequate health care—multiracial efforts based on those common interests will be **essential** for progressive social change. Moreover, if the factors that create and sustain antiblack racism are rooted in the basic structure of U.S. capitalism, as radical democrats and socialists have often argued, we may find that the interests of blacks significantly **overlap** with the interests of other groups fighting for workers' rights and economic justice.11 A narrow focus on racism as the cause of black disadvantage runs the risk of needlessly putting blacks in conflict with potential allies.12